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Financialization and Social Theory: An Interview with Dr. Greta Krippner 
GRACE CALE & LYDIA SHANKLIN ROLL 
University of Kentucky 
Greta Krippner is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of 
Michigan. Her research interests include economic sociology, political sociology, 
comparative and historical sociology, and social theory. She finds that state 
policies created the conditions conducive to financialization that solved some 
current policy dilemmas of the 1970s and 1980s, but created major weaknesses 
that would ultimately fail in the new millennium. Financialization of the economy 
was not a deliberate outcome sought by policymakers, but rather an inadvertent 
result of the state's attempts to solve other problems, especially the stagnation and 
deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s, the encouragement of foreign capital in the 
US economy, and large trade imbalances caused by direct foreign investment. 
disClosure Interviewers: Grace Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll 
DC: Our first question is, would you actually consider yourself a social theorist, 
and why or why not? 
GK: Yes, I strongly identify with social theory and think of myself as a theorist. 
My identification as a theorist reflects the fact that for the kind of work I do, a 
large part of the challenge is figuring out what the problem is that I’m interested 
in exploring. And that is something that requires a deep engagement with theory. 
As an example, starting this book project as a dissertation years ago, I was 
thinking about the transition in the structure of the economy that I came to refer to 
in the book as “financialization.” In setting out financialization as my problem, it 
wasn’t immediately obvious what I was after and what the parameters around the 
problem were. In historical research, problems tend to be open ended in this way, 
and in my mind, theory is necessary in order to see what the problems are and 
what is interesting about them. So, I can’t proceed with the kind of work I do 
empirically without having theoretical engagement be a salient component of the 
process. 
DC: At what point do you make that realization, that social theory was going to 
have to be something that you really had to engage with in order to do this project 
well? 
GK: Well, I would say, in terms of my own trajectory, it was relatively late in the 
game. I didn’t come into graduate school thinking that I was a theorist. I enjoyed 
the sociological theory courses I took. They were, just as for you, part of our 
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required curriculum, and I took them and enjoyed them. But I related to those 
courses like I did to my statistics coursework. They weren’t really key to my 
intellectual identity at the time. And then in the process of developing this project, 
for the reasons I’m describing, I found I was increasingly drawn towards thinking 
about theoretical questions and couldn’t in fact work through some of the issues I 
was interested in without that element.  
DC: All right. So, how would you actually describe your work for non-
sociologists? 
GK: That’s a very hard question, actually. I would say that my orientation is 
historical. So, I’m a historical sociologist, probably first and foremost. Which is to 
say that whatever it is I’m interested in, the way for me to understand it and get 
access to it is to trace its emergence, transformation, and evolution over time. 
That’s how I get leverage on the questions that are of interest to me. And I’m 
broadly interested in, for lack of a better term, economic questions. I say for lack 
of a better term because what we think of as “economic” is too narrow, partly 
because of the way the discipline of economics has defined that set of topics. So, I 
am interested in economic questions and processes very broadly construed. I 
suppose my research has a critical edge as well. The motivation underlying my 
research is a desire, as with many scholars, to understand the choices made in the 
past that have brought us to where we are now, and to make clear what those 
junctures and decisions were, where there were turning points, where there were 
other possibilities, to always look for the ways in which social arrangements are 
more mutable than we can sometimes see when we’re focused in the present 
moment. I think that is the great strength of both historical work and also social 
theory, in that they enable one to be more aware where there are alternatives and 
what those alternatives might look like.  
DC: How would you put your current, or most recent, projects in that context, of 
how social theory is brought into your work but more in a way understandable to 
a general audience? 
GK: So, how would I think about current work I’m doing in terms of the way that 
I’ve just characterized my work generally? The current project that I’m 
researching explores the emergence and evolution of the notion that we should 
bear the cost of our own risk. This is a widely accepted normative principle in 
market societies governing how risk should be distributed and shared. So, how did 
this become an established way of thinking about how risks are distributed, when 
did this come to seem like a natural way of doing things, how has it been 
legitimated, and where was it contested? There are other ways of thinking about 




how risk could be shared in our society that were historically available and were 
foreclosed.  
DC: How would you feel that, this new work, or Capitalizing on Crisis, might fit 
into a broader social theory narrative? 
GK: I think another underlying issue in my work is about expanding the boundary 
around the economy. One of the problems that we encounter as social scientists is 
we have these categories that we think with: state, market, community, and so on, 
and we tend to bound them off and treat them as pre-constructed realities. That’s a 
very prominent problem in economic sociology, which is another one of my 
primary intellectual identities. In economic sociology you see this kind of carving 
up of the space: here’s the market, here’s the state, and so on. I think one of the 
things that my work tries to do is to interrogate where the boundaries between 
those spheres of activity are drawn, and how when we relax that boundary we can 
see things that we don’t see as easily when we place ourselves within these 
categories and treat them as natural. So, if I were to say, here’s a way in which my 
work is pushing at social theory, it would be partly to think in a deep way about 
what we mean when we talk about the market, as opposed to the state, and what 
the relationship between those entities could be and how it has evolved, and not to 
start from a preconceived notion of what either one of those things is, and to let it 
emerge out of historical analysis.  
DC: Might you be able to summarize some of the key findings, or some of the 
biggest “take-home” messages of Capitalizing on Crisis, for our listeners who 
haven’t had the privilege to discover it yet?  
GK: Yes. So, the book is basically dealing with the financialization of the US 
economy over the period since the 1970s. By financialization, I’m referring to the 
growing importance of financial activities in the economy. The most dramatic 
way to see this is to look at where profits in the US economy are generated. So, if 
you are looking back at the 1950s and 1960s, financial profits as a share of total 
profits in the US economy are around 15 percent. The financial sector is 
significant, but does not represent an overwhelming share of profits in the total 
economy. By 2001, financial sector profits are over 40% of total profits generated 
in the US economy. That is a pretty dramatic change in the structure of the 
economy. And that is just the financial sector itself. The other piece you could 
look at, and I do look at in the book, is the financial income of non-financial 
corporations. What I do in the book, beyond empirically demonstrating this shift, 
is to provide an account of the state’s role in creating conditions that were 
conducive to financialization. Obviously there’s a lot more going on there than 
just state policy: there are changes in firm strategy, in market structure, and in 
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available technologies. But my interest in the book is in thinking about the policy 
environment that made the turn to finance possible. And, in a nutshell, the 
argument of the book is that there were a number of discrete policy decisions that 
were quite influential in shaping this outcome, but those policies decisions were 
not made with the goal or objective of creating a financialized economy. They 
were really ad hoc, inadvertent responses to unresolved distributional conflict in 
US society as growth rates in the economy slowed. And one of the interesting 
things to me about the financial crisis of 2008-2009 is that those distributional 
dilemmas came right back to the surface. Financialization was not a resolution of 
these problems, but a displacement of them into the future. It was a kind of 
deferral. So, without going into all the details, that is essentially the story of the 
book.  
DC: I know that some have wondered, and this may perhaps be a little bit of a 
Domhoffian argument, that given the various political groups of varying power 
levels who really strongly advocated for policies that paralleled the effects of 
financialization or neoliberalism, do you think that nobody really anticipated or 
encouraged this result? 
GK: Well, the interest group story is there. I guess the reason I chose to write the 
book as I did, which is not primarily an interest group story, was because I felt 
like that story has been overplayed a bit. The financial sector is obviously 
incredibly powerful and has been influential in enacting policies that have served 
its interests over many decades. That much is evident. But I think the way in 
which that analysis can go off track is that it exaggerates, to some degree, the 
coherence of the financial sector and therefore overstates its influence. So, with 
respect to the particular policy junctures that I determined were most significant 
for creating conditions conducive to financialization – the deregulation of the 
financial sector being key – the role of the financial industry is very interesting. 
First of all, the financial sector industry did not initially support financial 
deregulation. They were doing quite well in the existing regulatory environment 
and staunchly opposed any change.  I’m talking here primarily about the removal 
of interest rate ceilings from consumer savings deposits. It turns out, for reasons I 
detail in the book, that this seemingly arcane change was very important in terms 
of moving to an economy in which credit flowed freely. And if there’s one thing 
that gets you to a financialized economy, it is having access to credit that isn’t 
subject to any controls or constraints. So, with respect to that particular 
deregulation, the impetus for this came not from financial sector actors but 
primarily from consumers who were disgruntled that they were not getting better 
rates of return on their savings. So, that’s one example. The other example that 
gets a lot of attention in the financial deregulation story is Glass-Steagall, the 
removal of the Depression era banking laws that required a separation between 




investment banking institutions on the one hand and commercial banking 
institutions on the other. In that case, there was a long push to repeal Glass-
Steagall over three decades. Part of the reason that it took so long to repeal the 
law was that financial sector regulations created a compartmentalized financial 
system, and industries that had different roles in the financial system also had 
different interests vis-à-vis legislation. And so, with efforts to repeal Glass-
Steagall, one industry group might push for it, but another industry group would 
oppose it, and then the bill would get rewritten to accommodate the group that 
was opposing it and support for the bill would flip. And that is why it took three 
decades to repeal that legislation because there was no unified push behind it. To 
put the point more succinctly, the financial sector, while very powerful, is not a 
monolithic actor and has never been a monolithic actor. What people who are 
writing this kind of narrative tend to do is to look at the total political 
contributions that financial sector actors make, which are of course huge. But you 
can’t go from this fact to the conclusion that the financial sector, as some kind of 
cohesive whole, is exerting effective power because the financial sector itself 
wants different things and is internally divided. Once Glass-Steagall was repealed 
this changed somewhat, as the segmentation between different financial industries 
was removed. It is now up for grabs, and what that means is the possibility for 
deeper integration of financial sector actors and more cohesion. Arguably, the 
financial sector has become more cohesive and more influential and powerful as a 
result of this very deregulation, but that is something that occurs after the 
development that I’m describing.  
DC: I like that you actually just mentioned that you’ve been focusing on these 
trends in particular as they started in the past. So, would you be interested in 
sharing with us what you think the long-term implications of this financialization 
process could be? 
GK: This is where things get dark. One of the things I was thinking about as I was 
writing the book is that, as Monica Prasad argues in her new book, there is no 
natural constituency for financial regulation. In other words, once you move to a 
situation where you have untapped credit, and you’ve given everybody a piece of 
that action, then it is not just the financial sector intuitions that are benefitting 
from this, it is you and me when we can go get a mortgage with almost no down 
payment, and all of the ways that we subsidize our consumption. There is a very 
broad societal interest, if you want to put it that way, in having an economy in 
which credit is abundantly available. The downside is when you have an economy 
in which credit is abundantly available, you also have an economy that is very 
prone to asset price bubbles, as we’ve seen, first in the stock market and then in 
housing, and the problem is that this creates a lot of volatility. And, in the 
meantime, a lot of the social institutions that we’ve had in place to protect people 
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from volatility, the welfare state primarily, have eroded. So, this again goes back 
to the risk project we were talking about earlier: how our society handles these 
risks that are generated by the market, but in an environment where there is less 
regulation and more volatility. How do we cushion people from those risks? A 
result of financialization is a situation where there isn’t within the political system 
any constituency that is there to say, “No, we actually have to regulate these 
financial markets.” There are huge political costs to doing so and huge political 
benefits to being the political actor that continues to deliver credit. So, that is the 
difficulty.  Essentially, we have created a situation where we all have an interest 
in having a lot of credit, and it is very hard to think about what the political 
mechanisms are for moving away from that system even when we recognize it is 
dangerous. So, the long-term implication is that we will live in an economy in 
which we see more volatility, people more exposed to risk, without having the 
proper mechanisms in place to protect people from those risks, other than, again, 
going back to the newer research I was describing, asking people to manage on 
their own, which is a departure from the way we’ve handled our affairs through 
most of the 20
th
 century. 
DC: It’s interesting that you mentioned this idea of market volatility because, 
throughout our discussions in the market failures seminar, we’ve discussed how 
the parallel process of neoliberalism seems to relate also to market instability. 
And so, because neoliberalism appears to share a lot of the same causal factors as 
financialization, how would you describe the relationship between these two 
concepts? 
GK: Well, you warned me you were going to ask me this, and I haven’t made a 
lot of progress overnight in thinking about it. I think part of the difficulty is it 
depends what we mean by neoliberalism. There is the question of what we mean 
by financialization too, but at least in my own mind this is clearer, because I’ve 
worked in my own thinking to clarify the concept. As for neoliberalism the term 
is sometimes used to mean a set of discrete policies – some approach to monetary 
policy, a certain kind of tax policy, a certain approach to the welfare state – 
there’s a kind of laundry list of things that we think of when we say “neoliberal.” 
More broadly, the term is sometimes used to refer to what my colleague, Margaret 
Somers, calls “market fundamentalism.” So, the idea that we live in a society 
where there is a notion that the market is the preferred social institution by which 
we address various kinds of questions, and that we rely on markets to do X, Y, 
and Z. The market is privileged over the state, or community, or whatever the 
alternatives are thought to be. I think that’s probably the definition of 
neoliberalism with which I’m most comfortable. And if we think of it that way, 
then the relationship between that idea and financialization is so close that it is 
almost hard to separate them.  Because the turn to finance is closely connected to 




the deregulation of the market and the growing emphasis on the market in our 
society.  You can see that in the chapter in the book that deals with the evolution 
of monetary policy. It’s a complicated story, but I think the boiled down version is 
that policymakers figured out ways of implementing monetary policy that 
effectively transferred political responsibility for decisions that would constrain 
the economy from the state to the market. The state was never really out of the 
picture, but there was a kind of displacement of political responsibility onto the 
market. And that, in essence, is a neoliberal governance strategy. So in a sense, 
the things that I’m exploring with financialization are so integrally connected to 
what usually gets talked about in discussions of neoliberalism that I don’t know 
that I can neatly pull them apart and say that one has a causal effect on the other, 
because I see them as really bound up together.  
DC: So, as you know, returning a little bit to the idea of social theory, a lot of 
early graduate students often struggle to determine how to select research 
methods or to incorporate theory into their work. For example, you have often 
referenced Bell’s works. So, how did you select the theories and methods that 
were best for this project over the countless others you could have chosen? 
GK: I wish I could say I was systematic, or that there is a method to my madness, 
but I’m afraid it is more madness than method. Let me take your question apart by 
addressing the method and the theory separately. As far as the method, to be 
honest, the only way I know to begin a project is to find some problem in the 
present that needs unpacking. In the case of this particular project, I began this 
research as a graduate student in the late 1990s. This was the height of the so-
called dot-com bubble, when there was financial news on the front page of the 
newspaper nearly every day. You just couldn’t avoid it, every minute you were 
getting blitzed with finance, finance, finance, and I was really intrigued. Why is 
finance so salient in our culture at this particular moment? The way that most of 
the accounts that I was encountering talked about it was as a stock market bubble.  
And I thought the stock market was part of it, but I also believed the frothiness of 
the stock market fit into something much larger. So, I had a vague intuition that 
there was something there that was worth exploring, and it helped a great deal 
when I met Bob Pollin, who is a heterodox economist at UMass Amherst, and he 
started talking to me about “financialization.” I first learned that term from Pollin, 
and once I had the term I felt like I had something I could put my hands on and 
start to think about more systematically. So the first thing for me is, what is the 
problem in the present that I’m trying to understand? And once I’ve figured out 
what that problem in the present is, then my method is, again, always historical: I 
try to move back in time and to identify the key junctures and turning points. 
What was it that gave rise to this? How far am I going to trace this back? As far as 
researching my dissertation, I started by going to the business library. I began 
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pulling issues of Business Week off the library shelves – this was before 
everything was digitized! I actually went through Business Week and read every 
issue from the mid-1960s through the early 2000s. This gave me a way of 
immersing myself in the period.  From my reading, over many months, I was able 
to identify what seemed to be the key junctures that later formed the empirical 
chapters of the book. And within each chapter, the sources differ, but the method 
is basically the same. So, for the monetary policy chapter, for example, I was 
aware that there were transcripts from the Federal Reserve meetings, I knew the 
changes in monetary policy were extremely important for financialization, and I 
knew that I would have to somehow get on top of those developments and learn 
about them. And so, I started reading thousands and thousands of pages of Federal 
Reserve meeting transcripts, basically from beginning to end. For me, there’s 
something about reading sources through – okay, here’s the January 1979 
meeting, here’s the March 1979 meeting, here’s the June 1979 meeting – it gives 
you the chronology, and I think once you have the chronology you can create a 
narrative. Once you have a narrative, you have a theory, because you’ve 
implicitly theorized to write a narrative. I mean, when you write a narrative, you 
have made choices, and you may not recognize them as theoretical choices, but 
they are theoretical choices. So, it’s all about finding the narrative and then 
theorizing the narrative. That’s the method part of your question. The theory part 
is closely related, and maybe there’s not as much to say, other than to repeat what 
I just said: once you have a narrative, you have made theoretical choices. And 
then it’s a question of figuring out what those theoretical choices were, and being 
able to name them. And that requires reading as widely as you can. In this 
particular case, as you mentioned, Daniel Bell’s work turned out to be the key for 
the argument that the book makes. Actually I read Bell at the very end of the 
project when I was working on the final revision of the manuscript. I had read The 
Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, but I had never read The Cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism, which is really the touchstone of the book. As I was 
working on the final revision, I thought I’ve got to go and read this Daniel Bell, 
and the narrative that I had written was the narrative that Bell allowed me to 
theorize. The questions that Bell was grappling with in the 1970s were questions 
that illuminated the process that I was describing in the book so well. So, there’s a 
bit of luck involved, but figuring out what the relevant pieces are and weaving it 
all together is for me the most satisfying part of research. 
DC: You’ve mentioned several times that you really strongly identify as a 
historical sociologist. You also mentioned economic sociology, and political 
economy. So, how did you particularly select your research specializations? Were 
they kind of already a function of preexisting interests? Or, did you find that you 
just, kind of, stumbled across them as you worked on other research projects? Or, 




might it have been something else that brought you to that realization that, you 
know, ‘I can place myself within these professional categories’? 
GK: Political economy was the term that I had grabbed onto as an undergraduate 
to characterize my interests. Beyond that, economic sociology, historical 
sociology, social theory were all things that I discovered along the way and were 
not identities I had already developed when started graduate school.  I didn’t even 
know what economic sociology was, actually, and the same is also true of 
historical sociology. I was more familiar with social theory, but as I said earlier, 
this wasn’t something I identified with at the beginning in defining my interests. 
So, I was a young graduate student when I started, and an unformed one, for 
better or worse. Now we see students coming in with very specific ideas about 
their future dissertation work, and they are much more professionalized and have 
a much clearer sense of what the discipline is than was the case for me. I just had 
no idea. The only thing that was constant was an orientation to political economy 
questions. Everything else fell into place as I took classes, sifted through what 
was interesting to me and what wasn’t, and especially, as I started to work on 
research. And it was a continual process of searching, and one that was a little bit 
angst ridden for me, because I never felt like I really fit anywhere, I never quite 
felt like I was a card-carrying anything. I felt a little bit at the margin of all of 
these areas, but over time I’ve come to feel quite the contrary, that I inhabit all of 
them quite comfortably. So, that is just a process that takes time, or took time in 
my case, and I think it is good to be open to the journey. It seems to me that 
we’ve gotten overly anxious about getting people stamped as soon as they walk in 
the door. I don’t think that’s necessarily conducive to having the best intellectual 
experience.  
DC: That is all we have for you. Thank you for coming to speak with us. 
